Pakistan Army
From Wikinfo
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The Pakistan Army (Urdu: پاک فوج) is the largest branch of the Pakistan military, and is mainly responsible for protection of the state borders, the security of administered territories and defending the national interests of Pakistan within the framework of its international obligations.
The Pakistan Army, combined with the Navy and Air Force, makes Pakistan's armed forces the 7th largest military in the world. The Army is modelled on the United Kingdom armed forces and came into existence after the independence in 1947. It has an active force of 620,000 personnel and 600,000 men in reserve that continue to serve until the age of 45. The Pakistani Army is a volunteer force and has been involved in many conflicts with India. Combined with this rich combat experience, the Army is also actively involved in contributing to United Nations peacekeeping efforts. Other foreign deployments have consisted of Pakistani Army personnel as advisers in many African, South Asian and Arab countries. The Pakistani Army maintained division and brigade strength presences in some of the Arab countries during the past Arab-Israeli Wars, and the first Gulf War to help the Coalition. The Pakistani Army is led by the Chief of Army Staff, currently Pervez Musharraf, who is also the President of Pakistan.
Combat Doctrine
Pakistani Army has espoused a doctrine of limited "offensive-defense" which it has tried to refine consistently ever since 1989 when it was pushed out to the formations during "Exercise Zarb-e-Momin". The main purpose of this strategy is to launch a sizeable offensive into enemy territory rather than wait to be hit from the enemy's offensive attack. The doctrine is based on the premise that while on the offensive, the enemy can be kept off-balance while allowing Pakistani Army to be able to seize enemy territory of strategic importance which can be used as a bargaining chip on the negotiating table. In order to do this, currently Pakistani Army maintains two sizable strike Corps which will be backed up by holding Corps forming the defensive tier behind the strike corps. By pushing the offensive into the enemy territory, the Pakistani Army hopes to consolidate its gains inside the enemy's territory and will attempt to keep the war on the enemy side of the border rather than giving ground on the Pakistani side.
In the 1990s, the Army created a strong centralized corps of reserves for its formations in the critical semi-desert and desert sectors in southern Punjab and Sindh provinces. These new formations were rapidly equipped with assets needed for mechanized capability. These reserve formations are dual-capable, meaning they can be used for offensive as well as defensive (holding) purposes.
Pakistan, today has a 45 day reserve of ammunition and fuel as compared to only 13 days in 1965 and has fairly effective and efficient lines of communication and can fully mobilize its formations in less than 96 hours owing to the lack of depth in the country's North South axis.
Motto
The motto of the Pakistani Army reads: "Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabilillah". Translated into English, it means "Faith, Piety, to strive in the path of Allah".
Organization
The Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), formerly called the Commander in Chief (C in C), is challenged with the responsibility of commanding the Pakistani Army. The COAS operates from army headquarters in Rawalpindi, near Islamabad. The Principal Staff Officers assisting him in his duties at the Lieutenant General level include a Chief of General Staff (CGS), who supervises the day to day running of the army, Director General Military Operations (DGMO), responsible for the overall operational planning; the Master General of Ordnance (MGO); the Quarter-Master General (QMG); the Adjutant General (AG); the Inspector General of Training and Evaluation (IGT&E); and the Military Secretary (MS). The headquarters function also includes the Judge Advocate General (JAG), and the Comptroller of Civilian Personnel, the Chief of the Corps of Engineers (E-in-C)who is also head of Military Engineering Service (MES), all of them also report to the Chief of the Army Staff.
List of Chiefs of Army Staff
- General Sir Frank Messervy (August 15 1947 - February 10 1948)[1]
- General Sir Douglas David Gracey (February 11 1948 - January 16 1951)[1]
- Field Marshal Ayub Khan (January 16 1951 - October 26 1958)[1]
- General Musa Khan (October 27 1958 - June 17 1966)[1]
- General Yahya Khan (June 18 1966 – December 20 1971)[1]
- General Gul Hassan (December 20 1971 - March 3 1972)[1]
- General Tikka Khan (March 3 1972 – March 1 1976)[1]
- General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (April 1 1976 - August 17 1988)[1]
- General Mirza Aslam Beg (August 17 1988 - August 16 1991)[1]
- General Asif Nawaz (August 16 1991 - January 8 1993)[1]
- General Wahid Kakar (January 8 1993 - December 1 1996)[1]
- General Jehangir Karamat (December 1 1996 - October 6 1998)[1]
- General Pervez Musharraf (October 7 1998–present)[1]
Structure of Army units
The Pakistani Army is divided into two main branches which are Arms and Services. Arms include infantry, artillery, armor, engineers,medical and communications and Services includes ordnance Corps, maintenance and repair Corps, electrical & mechanical engineering (EME) corps, supply & transport corps (ASC), education corps (AEC), military police corps, and the remount, veterinary, and farm corps.
| Army Unit | Number of Units |
|---|---|
| Corps | 9 |
| Infantry Divisions | 19 |
| Artillery Divisions | 2 |
| Aviation Squadrons | 19 |
| 2 Special forces Brigades with 5 Battalions | 1 |
| Armored Recce Regiment | 8 |
| Independent Mechanical Infantry Brigades | 7 |
| Independent Armoured brigades | 8 |
| Artillery Brigades | 4 |
| Air Defence Command with 3 Air Defence Groups, 8 AD Brigades | 8 |
| Engineer brigades | 8 |
| Armoured divisions | 2 |
- Corps: A Corp in the Pakistani Army usually consists of two or more Divisions and is commanded by a Lieutenant General. Currently the Pakistani Army has 9 Corps. The tenth one is the recently raised Army Strategic Force Command (ASFC), responsible for bearing the national strategic and nuclear assets. Initially a Division, but then raised to the status of a Corps.
- Division: Each division is commanded by a Major General, and usually holds three Brigades including infantry, artillery, engineers and communications units in addition to logistics (supply and service) support to sustain independent action. Except for the Divisions operating in the mountains, all the Divisions have at least one armoured unit, some have even more depending upon their functionality. The most major of all ground force combat formations is the infantry division. Such a division would primarily hold three infantry brigades. There are 19 Infantry divisions, 2 Armored Divisions and 1 Artillery Division in the Pakistani Army.
- Brigade: A Brigade is under the command of a Brigadier or sometimes a Colonel and comprises three or more Battalions of different units depending on its functionality. An independent brigade would be one that primarily consists of an artillery unit, an infantry unit, an armour unit and logistics to support its actions. Such a brigade is not part of any division and is under direct command of a corps.
- Battalion: Each battalion is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel and has roughly 600 to 900 soldiers under his command. This number varies depending on the functionality of the battalion. A battalion comprises either three batteries (in case of artillery and air defence regiments - generally named Papa, Quebec, Romeo, and Sierra) or four companies (in case of infantry regiments - generally named Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta - and other arms excluding armored units that are organized into squadrons) each under the command of a major and comprising of individual subunits called sections (which are further divisible into platoons and squads).[2]
Regiments
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*The President's Bodyguard formed at independence from members of the Governor General's Bodyguard, itself successor to the Governor's Troop of Moghals raised in 1773
*5th Horse is the successor to the 1st Sikh Irregular Cavalry (Wales's Horse), and the 2nd Sikh Irregular Cavalry, both raised in 1857
*6th Lancers is the successor to The Rohilkhand Horse raised in 1857, and the 4th Sikh Irregular Cavalry raised in 1858
*Guides Cavalry (Frontier Force) is the successor to the Corps of Guides raised in 1846
*11th Cavalry (Frontier Force) is the successor to 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry and 3rd Regiment of Punjab Cavalry, both raised in 1849
*13th Lancers is the successor to the 1st Native Troop raised in 1804, and the 2nd Native Troop raised in 1816
*19th Lancers is the successor to the 2nd Mahratta Horse (Tiwana Horse) raised in 1858, and Fane's Horse raised in 1860
*25th Cavalry (Frontier Force) is the famous unit which stopped Indian armour thrust in Chawinda in 1965
*The Punjab Regiment formed in 1956 from the 1st, 14th, 15th and 16th Punjab Regiments; can be traced back to the 3rd Battalion of Coast Sepoys raised in 1759
*The Baloch Regiment formed in 1956 from the 8th Punjab Regiment, The Baluch Regiment, and The Bahawalpur Regiment; can be traced back to the 3rd Extra Madras Battalion raised in 1798
*The Frontier Force Regiment is the successor to the Frontier Brigade raised in 1846
*The Azad Kashmir Regiment was raised in 1947, became part of the army in 1971
*The Sindh Regiment was raised in 1980 from battalions of the Punjab Regiment and Baloch Regiment
*The Northern Light Infantry was formed in 1977 from various paramilitary units of scouts, became part of the army in 1999 after the Kargil War
*The Special Service Group was formed in 1959 around a cadre from the Baluch Regiment
Corps
There are 9 Corps located at various garrisons all over Pakistan.
| Corps | HQ Location | Major Formations under Corps | Commander |
|---|---|---|---|
| I Corps | Mangla, Punjab | 6th Armored Division (Kharian), 17th Infantry Division (Kharian), 37th Infantry Division (Gujranwala) | Lt Gen Sajjad Akram[3] |
| II Corps | Multan, Punjab | 1st Armored Division (Multan), 14th Infantry Division (Okara) | Lt Gen Sikandar Afzal[3] |
| IV Corps | Lahore, Punjab | 10th Infantry Division (Lahore), 11th Infantry Division (Lahore) | Lt Gen Shafaatullah Shah[4] |
| V Corps | Karachi, Sindh | 16th Infantry Division (Pano Akil), 18th Infantry Division (Hyderabad) | Lt Gen Ahsan Azhar Hayat[3] |
| X Corps | Rawalpindi, Punjab | FCNA (Gilgit), 12th Infantry Division (Murree), 19th Infantry Division (Mangla), 23rd Infantry Division (Jhelum) | Lt Gen Mohsin Kamal[5] |
| XI Corps | Peshawar, North West Frontier Province | 7th Infantry Division (Peshawar), 9th Infantry Division (Kohat) | Lt Gen Masood Aslam[6] |
| XII Corps | Quetta, Balochistan | 33rd Infantry Division (Quetta), 41st Infantry Division (Quetta) | Lt Gen Khalid Shamim Wyne[6] |
| XXX Corps | Gujranwala, Punjab | 8th Infantry Division (Sialkot), 15th Infantry Division (Sialkot) | Lt Gen Waseem Ahmed Ashraf[7] |
| XXXI Corps | Bahawalpur, Punjab | 35th Infantry Division (Bahawalpur), 40th Infantry Division (Okara) | Lt Gen Raza Muhammad Khan[6] |
Present commanders
*This list of generals and lieutenant generals is maintained according to their seniority in the army.
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History of the Pakistani Army
- See also: Military history of Pakistan
1947-48 Kashmir War
The 1947-48 War was an improvised war fought on an ad hoc basis. It began with some tangible operational strategy and little definite strategy on the Pakistan side and a definite operational strategy on the Indian side. At the onset Mr Jinnah the Governor General of Pakistan ordered the British Acting C in C Pakistan Army to order two brigades into Kashmir, one on the Sialkot-Jammu Axis and the other on Murree-Muzaffarabad-Srinagar-Axis. This was a tangible plan based on a precise strategy of severing Indian landward and aerial lines of communication to Kashmir. The plan was rendered null and void since the Britisher refused to obey Jinnah’s order.
This was followed by a hastily scrambled series of actions with regular Pakistan Army officers leading irregulars, irregulars besieging Indian/Dogra garrisons and conducting mini-wars against Chamb, Naushera, Srinagar, Skardu, Leh etc. In April 1948 the regular Pakistan Army entered the scene. At this stage the Indians were in a strategically disadvantageous position. Leh being cut off, Poonch besieged, Skardu besieged, Naushera threatened etc. At this stage the Pakistani strategy was to contain Indian Army advance towards Muzaffarabad, capture Poonch and safeguard Pakistan’s soft underbelly opposite Gujrat. No one at this stage thought of a ceasefire, which would have been of great strategic advantage to Pakistan. The Indians conceived a fine plan to outflank Muzaffarabad and executed a brilliant brigade level march across against the 3,000 metres plus high Nastachun Pass, thus unexpectedly forcing their way with great ease to Tithwal. The Pakistani official history noted “Brigadier Harbux Singh, commander of the 163 Brigade waited at Tithwal for two days to let the rest of his brigade join him there . He lingered a little longer to prepare for his next move and perhaps also to coordinate his moves with that of the Indian offensive in the Jhelum Valley for a two pronged push towards Muzaffarabad. This delay changed the subsequent course of history in Kishanganga Valley, as it enabled the first two companies of 4/16 Punjab under Major Mohammad Akbar Khan to reach by a forced march in the vicinity of Tithwal and take up positions there”1. The Pakistanis saved their position by reinforcing it with a brigade.
On the operational level the Pakistanis did well by capturing Pandu a position of tactical importance in the Jhelum Valley by a brilliant infiltration plan conceived by Commander 101 Brigade Brigadier Akbar Khan DSO with the indomitable Major Ishaq MC as his Brigade Major. Akbar deputed Lt Col Harvey Kelly, commanding 4/10 Baluch to plan the attack in detail.2 Pandu, however, was an operational episode of great tactical significance but limited strategic value.
From April 1948 to December 1948 the Pakistani GHQ merely reacted tactically moving companies and battalions while the Indians moved strategically. In Phase One, they recaptured Rajauri the gateway to Poonch with a single tank squadron! In Phase Two, they achieved two strategic triumphs! They forced their way through Zojila Pass driving on to relieve Leh and capture Kargil Dras and they relieved Poonch which was a mini-Indian East Pakistan surrounded from all sides by Pakistani troops.
At this stage the Pakistani GHQ had conceived the Operation Venus. Venus was a thrust against the Indian line of communication leading to Poonch Valley with an infantry and a heavy tank brigade in Naushera-Beri Patan area. At this stage the Indians were involved in the relief of Poonch and Leh and strategically off balance. The official account of 1970, however, maintains that the aim of Venus was not to sever the Indian line of communication to Poonch but merely to force the Indians for ceasefire which they did and which came into effect on night 31 Dec 1948/01 January 1949. If ceasefire was the aim then the Pakistani strategy was barren since a ceasefire in July 1948 would have been far more strategically desirable! This was so since in April 1948 Zojila (captured by Gilgit Scouts under Lieut Shah Khan on 7th July 1948) the gateway to Srinagar as well as Ladakh in Pakistani hands, the frontline near Rajauri and Poonch surrounded by Pakistani troops/irregulars. It is not clear what the Pakistani GHQ advised the civilians at this stage but no records have been made public which prove that they gave any advice!
In the 1960s General Fazal-i- Muqeem asserted that the ceasefire of 1948 took place to the army’s horror since the army was close to a great victory. However, this point is refuted by the Pakistan Army’s Official account of 1970. Much later in 1976 General Sher Ali who was commanding a brigade of the Venus Force asserted that had the operation been launched Pakistani tanks would have been in Jammu within no time! This has to be taken with a pinch of salt once we compare it to the performance of armour in an offensive role in 1965 and 1971!
The Kashmir War ended with the Indians as masters of Poonch Valley, Srinagar Valley and Leh Valley but with a communication to all three valleys running precariously close to the Pakistani border! Thus strategically the Indian position despite all their strategic triumphs was not secure since their line of communications offered multiple objectives to any single Pakistani thrust. One tank brigade with a twenty mile thrust could threaten the existence of a whole Indian army corps. The Indians took no care to remedy this state of affairs despite many war games held in their Kashmir Corps to show that the Pakistanis could threaten the Indian line of communication in Poonch Valley.3
1965 War
The 1965 War was a comical affair! Civilians at the foreign ministry assessed that the Indians could be knocked out at the strategic level while soldiers at the highest military level and political level, the president being a soldier were not interested in any military adventure. The civilian hawks led by Bhutto, however, were in league with a group of generals and brigadiers within the army and finally succeeded in persuading the president
(famous for tactical timidity in Burma) into embarking on a military adventure. Musa the army chief had little strategic insight and was against any military adventure in which he may be forced to exercise his qualities of leadership! Musa had rudimentary understanding of strategy and tank warfare since he was a political choice appointed more because he was seen as politically no threat rather than for any military strategic or operational talent!
The Pakistani offensive plan i.e. a thrust against Indian line of communication at Akhnur in case of a limited war in Kashmir or/and against Indian line of communication between Indian Corps holding Ravi-Sutlej Corridor at Jandiala Guru on Amritsar-Jullundhur road in case of an all out war was brilliant in conception. This was so because if successful any of the two plans would have forced the Indians to sue for peace at best and to surrender at worst. No less an authority than the Indian Western Command C in C Harbaksh Singh thus confessed
“A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the Grand Trunk Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in the helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for want of readily available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing deep into our vitals. It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered in retrospect at this stage”.
To the Pakistan Army’s misfortune a plan which was brilliant at the strategic and operational level failed simply because those who were leading the military machine at the highest level lacked the strategic insight as well as resolution! The first opportunity was thus missed in Chamb-Jaurian Sector, when even a foreigner i.e. Chinese Foreign Minister visiting Pakistani thought that Akhnur5 was the key!
The second and most serious operational failure occurred in Khem Karan.This had more to do with poor execution at the divisional and brigade level and poor initial higher organization and composition of troops at the divisional level. The first being an operational failure and the second being an organizational failure at the higher command level.
At the operational and tactical level three events stand out in the war i.e. the Grand Slam Operation in Chamb-Jaurian, blunting of Indian offensive at Chawinda at Gadgor on 8th September when one lone tank regiment gave a severe mauling to two tank regiments out of a total available Indian force of an armoured division, and a brigade level counter attack in Lahore Sector.
Grand Slam failed because of change of command! Not because Akhtar Malik was better than Yahya but because one man either Akhtar or Yahya should have conducted the whole operation! The Indians admitted that their position was saved because of the pause of 48 hours, which occurred at Tawi after the Pakistani Chief Musa ordered change of horses in the mid stream!
Now the battle of Gadgor. Technically Gadgor was 24 Infantry Brigade Group versus 1st Indian Armoured Division. In reality the contest was 25 Cavalry versus Poona and Hodsons Horse since 24 Brigade Commander told Colonel Nisar to “do something”6 the vaguest order of 1965 War! Nisar had no idea of what was in front but by a miraculous coup d oeil deployed his tank regiment 25 Cavalry in a manner which would produce an instant nervous breakdown in an instructor who taught tank tactics at the armour school! 25 Cavalry was deployed by Nisar like a thin line of steel! Like a thin net to catch a whale! The manoeuvre if it can be called one succeeded because the Indian brigade commander was paralysed by the fog of war! Thus Commander Indian 1st Armoured Brigade saw a finger as a mountain! He saw a threat to his flanks which in reality was a half squadron of Indian 62 Cavalry which had lost its way and fired at Indian Artillery opposite Rangre! What Nisar deployed after the “Do Something” order was seen by the Indian brigade commander as a tank brigade! Thus he lost the will to use two uncommitted tank regiments to outflank the Pakistani position! Gadgor was a psychological defeat inflicted on K.K Singh by Nisar with Nisar not knowing what was in front of him and K.K Singh over estimating three times what was really in front of him. Thus in cognitive terms, at Gadgor was a tank regiment commander who did not know what was in front of him against a tank brigade commander who was overawed by what he assessed was in front of him and was reduced into a state of total inertia and indecision. The important factor in this decisive battle was the fact that tangibly K.K Singh had the third tank regiment as well as three uncommitted squadrons within his two committed tank regiments with which he could have easily outflanked Nisar and got to his rear! Nisar had tangibly no reserves with which he could have countered K.K’s outflanking manoeuvre.
The counter attack of Brigadier Qayyum Sher in Lahore Sector was a successful divisional battle ordered by Major General Sarfaraz MC and executed by Brigadier Qayyum Sher most resolutely! It produced a crisis on the Indian side and threw the Indians off balance! Both retired in the same rank sometimes after the war!
1971 War
The 1971 War was a strange war! The Indians won great glory but failed to strategically solve their military problems! They overran East Pakistan creating a new state of Bangladesh but merely reduced Pakistan’s defence problems and increased their own problems by creating a new state which became more hostile to India and is far more difficult to militarily to deal with than the old East Pakistan!
The Indians, and an authority no less eminent than their 1971 GOC Western Command General Candeth have admitted that had the Pakistanis started a pre-emptive war in October 1971 all their plans to attack East Pakistan would have been thrown to the winds!7 But strategic insight had not been inculcated yet in the Pakistan Army! The Pakistanis waited and allowed the Indians to attack them in December 1971.
Much has been said about a Pakistani counter offensive in December 1971 to save East Pakistan. At this stage the Indian 1 Corps was in position and the Pakistani Higher Command like K.K Singh on 8th September to gamble their last card! There was a reason for this inaction. One that the cost was too heavy and the second that armour higher commanders (the CGS Gul Hassan and GOC 1st Armoured Division) as Yahya Khan asserts had lost the will to launch an attack.
Two cases of operational brilliance and one case of a Gadgor type tactical heroic stand out in 1971. These are the cases of the Pakistani 23 Division offensive in Chamb, the Indian defence of Poonch and the Barapind-Jarpal Battle. In Chamb Pakistan’s General Eftikhar successfully fought a divisional battle in which he deliberately manoeuvred a force of two plus tank regiments inflicting a severe mauling on the Indians forcing them to abandon Chamb. Eftikhar was firmly in control at all stages. When his initial tank thrust was checked at Maandiala he did not sink into inertia or indecision like K.K Singh at Gadgor or Pakistan’s Naseer at Khem Karan! Nor did Eftikhar tell his armoured brigade commander to “Do Something”! Eftikhar did not abdicate the conduct of operational strategy to any tank regiment of tank brigade commander! He resolutely regrouped his command and launched another attack from the south emerging victorious! The second case was the Indian stand at Poonch. The Pakistanis conceived a fine plan to capture Poonch but the Indian brigade commander at Poonch was too resolute while the Pakistani divisional and brigade commanders at Poonch lost their nerve!
The third case of a Gadgor type battle occurred at Barapind! Here the Pakistani tank brigade commander gave a simple order to resort to counter penetration to his tank regiment commander who on his own converted it into an attack! Unfortunately he carried out a piece meal attack, first sending in a squadron and then two more! The Indians admit that had 13 Lancers attacked with all three squadrons8 they would have broken through despite nominal artillery support. The hero of this battle was not the Indian brigade or regiment commander but the Indian squadron who blunted the attack and the Indian troop leader Arun Khetarpal who stopped the attack by skin of his teeth losing his life in the process! In words of Indian Armoured Corps historian the Indian success was attributable to a ‘last ditch stand by just one tank troop leader’.
1984 Crisis
The 1984 Crisis was a calculated Indian response against alleged Pakistani involvement in the Sikh Insurgency in Punjab. Tangibly the Indian position was far superior to Pakistan since Pakistan Army was still equipped with the old T-59s. The situation was saved by two Individuals who polished off the Indian ‘Durga Devi’ thus leading to a swift de-escalation of the crisis.
Siachen Crisis
1987 Crisis
The 1987 Crisis was a case of over enthusiasm at the military level with little outward enthusiasm at the highest political level. The Indian Chief Sundarji was living in visions of Glory and visualized that a military manoeuvre would escalate into a war which would lead to a successful Indian military thrust severing the Pakistani line of communication in Rahimyar Khan Sector thus leading to the emergence of a new state in Pakistani Sindh and the creation of a second Indian Field Marshal after Manekshaw i.e Sundarji!
Comically Sundarji’s visions of glory were not matched by strategic insight! Thus he was overawed into inaction and inertia like K.K Singh at Gadgor, once the Pakistani High Command relocated the Pakistani reserves northwards in a purely defensive move!
1987 was a watershed and marked the Indian Army at its lowest position in the eyes of the highest Indian political leadership
vis-a-vis the high position of 1971. Sundarji destroyed all that the Indian Army had gained in 25 years with one night of irresolution and inertia!
1999 Crisis
The 1999 Crisis in Kargil were the result of an audacious Pakistani plan to inflict a sharp but highly subtle psychological defeat on the Indians by threatening the Indian line of communication to Leh and Siachen by placing a small Pakistani force on the heights overlooking the Dras-Kargil-Leh Road. The execution at tactical level was brilliant albeit marked by poor logistic arrangements at divisional level! The Pakistani political leadership lost the resolution to press home the move to its final conclusion. Full facts are not available about what the Pakistan Army’s highest leadership wanted at this point in time.
The Indians payed a heavy price in terms of casualties for an intelligence failure. What Pakistan gained or lost is not clear although a debate continues about who was Kargils winner. Kargil stands out as merely one stage in a long series of actions in Pakistani military history. If Kargil was a political failure then logically the army should have packed off the political leadership in June 1999! Yet it chose to blame Nawaz only later on like it blamed Liaquat for calling off Operation Venus in 1948! Have things changed or we changed!
Conclusion
Indo-Pak Military history is a continuous story of strategic failures and a mix of operational successes and failures. At the tactical level both the armies fought well.
The reasons for the strategic failures are historical. Both states are successor states of the British Colonial Indian Empire. Indians were not groomed or trained for making strategic decisions. Strategic insight is the result of a process spread over many generations. The German General Staff was not created by a sudden flight. Even the British Empire was not created by the strategic genius of one man! Militarily the failure of both armies at the higher level is more easy to understand. Both were the continuation of a colonial army designed for internal security and brigade level actions. The Indian Army in WW Two either fought as part of a larger British Army or in circumstances of immense material superiority with massive US military aid as in Burma! The political failure in Pakistan is equally simple to explain since in words of Mr Jinnah most of the Muslim politicians would not do anything without consulting the DC (Deputy Commissioner)! That may be a reason why Nawaz Sharif went to DC!
1977 - 1999
In 1977 the Pakistan Army took over the government of Pakistan after a coup by General Zia ul-Haq, which saw the end of another democratically elected government leading to the hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, after he was tried and found guilty of conspiracy of murdering a politician named Kasuri. General Zia ul-Haq ruled as a military dictator until his mysterious explosion aircraft death in 1988.
Pakistani army also helped the Saudi Arabian Government in regaining the control of the Kaaba with the help of French Commandos. Pakistani and French security forces retook the shrine in a battle which left approximately 250 dead, and 600 wounded. Pakistani and French troops reportedly entered the Grand Mosque and flooded it with water; applied electricity to it; and electrocuted most of the rebels. Other reports said that paralysing gas was used. Still others say the highly trained French GIGN counter-terrorist commandos led the assault. The Pakistanis and French were called in after poor results from assaults by the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). 127 were reported to have been killed.
In the mid-1970s the Pakistani Army was involved in fighting a popular uprising in Baluchistan. Various Baluchi factions, some with the oblique support of the USSR, wanted independence or at least greater provincial rights. The rebellion was put down but the Army suffered heavy casualties. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States began to provide large scale military and economic aid to Pakistan to modernize its conventional military capability and, ostensibly at least, prevent any Soviet attacks on it. This aid was also intended as an incentive for Pakistan to aid guerrilla forces in Afghanistan. The SSG created a unit called the Black Storks in which SSG commandos were dressed up as Afghan Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war. They were then flown into Afghanistan and provided the Mujahideen with support. The United States allocated about 40% of its assistance package to non-reimbursable credits for military purchases, the fourth largest program after Israel,Egypt, and Turkey. The remainder of the aid program was devoted to economic assistance.
After the Soviets withdrew by 1989 and the Pakistani Nuclear weapons program nearing maturity, Pakistan was placed under sanctions by USA in 1990. Various weapon systems ordered by Pakistan such as F-16 Jets were not delivered but various amendments have authorized return of spare parts and end items already paid for by Pakistan. There was a period of international sanctions due to Pakistan's nuclear tests. During 1999 the Pakistan Army for the fourth time overthrew a democratically elected government which resulted in additional sanctions being placed against Pakistan
The Army fought a brief but bloody border skirmish with India in Kargil 1999.
1999 - Present
In October 1999 the Pakistan Army for the fourth time overthrew a democratically elected government which resulted in additional sanctions being placed against Pakistan, resulting in the current President, General Pervez Musharraf, coming to power in a bloodless coup
In October 2007, General Musharraf ran for president in a controversial election, in uniform. A case was brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan questioning the ability of the serving Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Army taking part in politics and being able to run for president. While the case was still pending with the Supreme Court, General Musharraf fearing a decision against him, suspended the constitution and proclaimed a Martial Law under the guise of emergency. This was followed by widespread arrests of lawyers, political workers, teachers and members of civil society in general.
Since the 9/11 incident, Pakistan unrecognized Taliban and has become a key ally of USA in the fight against terrorism. As part of United States war on terrorism, the army has moved over 80,000 troops to the Pakistan-Afghan border to patrol against extreme elements cross border infiltration. The Army has started new operations in Waziristan and Swat in late 2007, which have resulted in over 600 militants killed.
The Pakistan Army commenced counter insurgency operations in Baluchistan from 2004. With some of the heaviest fighting taking place in 2006 resulting in the killing of the leader of the Nawab Akbar Bugti and the supression of the Baluchistan Liberation Army.
Pakistan Army Role in Peacekeeping
[[Image:Monuc peacekeepers.jpg|thumb|UN peacekeepers (from Pakistan) to the DRC in 2005]
In the wake of the new world power equilibrium a more complex security environment has emerged. It is characterized by growing national power politics and state implosions which have necessitated involvement of the United Nations peace keeping forces for conflict resolution.
The United Nations has been undertaking peace keeping operations since its inception, but the need for employment of peace keeping forces has increased manifold since the Gulf War. In 1992 there were 11000 Blue Berets deployed around the world, by the end of the year the figure rose to 52000. Presently it exceeds a staggering figure of 80,000 troops.
Pakistan, which firmly believes in the purposes and the principles of the United Nations Charter has, since 1960, been actively participating in the United Nations multi-national efforts to maintain peace and order around the globe. Its contribution to United Nations peace-keeping has been as wide ranging a the varied cultural, geographic, political and security conditions in which it had to operate.
Pakistan’s participation in peace-keeping activities of the United Nations reflects its belief in the brotherhood of mankind and its commitment to peace across the globe. The humble contribution it has made in this regard bespeaks its desire to see the principles of human dignity, freedom and self-determination applied to all the peoples struggling to secure their inalienable basic rights.
Pakistan's participation in peacekeeping activities of the United Nations reflects its belief in the brotherhood of mankind and its commitment to peace across the globe. Ever since its participation in first UN Peace Keeping Mission in Congo in 1960. Pakistan has remain committed to this cause.
Pakistan Contribution in UN Peace Keeping Missions
- UN Operation in Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964
- UN Security Force in New Guinea, West Irian (UNSF) 1962-1963
- UN Yemen Observer Mission Yemen (UNYOM) 1963-1964
- UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) 1989-1990
- UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) 1991-2003
- UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) 1993-1996
- UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 1992-1993
- UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) 1992-1995
- UN Protection Forces in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) 1992-1995
- UN Observer Mission for Rawanda (UNAMIR) 1993-1996
- UN Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM III) 1995-1997
- UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) 1996-1997
- UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) 1996-2002
- UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) 2001-2005
- UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 1999-to-date
- UN Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) 2003-to-date
- UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 2003-to-date
- UN Mission in Ivory Coast (ONUCI) 2004-to-date
- UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) 2004-to-date
- UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 2005-to-date
- UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 1999-to-date
Political Power of the Army
The Pakistani army has always played an integral part of the Pakistan government and politics since its inception. It has virtually remained as the 3rd party that has seized power every now and then in the name of stabilizing Pakistan. The first of them was General Ayub Khan who came to power through a coup in 1958. Later, General Yahya Khan would assume power in 1969. After the 71 war the democratic setup was restored only to be cut short in 1977 after a coup which saw the end of another democratically elected Government and the Hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistani Premier. General Zia ul-Haq ruled as a dictator virtually unopposed until his death in 1988. Despite the exit of the army from mainstream politics, the political muscle of the military was everpresent. The current President, General Pervez Musharraf, came to power in a bloodless coup in October 1999 overthrowing the last democratically elected government led by Nawaz Sharif.
Fauji Foundation
Fauji Foundation (established in 1954) is a charitable trust, operating on a completely self sustaining basis, channeling approximately 80% of the profits from commercial ventures into social protection programmes that serve a beneficiary population representing approximately 7% of the country’s population. [15]
Spending more than Rs. 21 billion since inception on welfare, the Foundation provides services in the areas of healthcare, education, educational stipends, technical and vocational training.
- Over 2.1 million patients treated per year through the FF Healthcare System
- Approximately 38,000 students enrolled in the FF Education System
- Approximately 70,000 educational stipends dispersed each year
- Over 6,000 individuals trained annually through the Vocational & Technical Training Centres
Considered the most sustainable social protection mechanism in the country, Fauji Foundation provides welfare services to approximately 10 million individuals on a completely sustainable basis. Running autonomously for over 50 years, the foundation has been providing healthcare, education, vocational and technical training to over 7% of the country’s population through 294 welfare projects. [16]
Personnel Training
Enlisted ranks
Most enlisted personnel used to come from rural families, and many have only rudimentary literacy skills, but with the increase in the litracy level the requirements have been raised to Matriculate level (10th Grade). Recruits are processed gradually through a paternalistically run regimental training center, taught the official language, Urdu, if necessary, and given a period of elementary education before their military training actually starts.
In the thirty-six-week training period, they develop an attachment to the regiment they will remain with through much of their careers and begin to develop a sense of being a Pakistani rather than primarily a member of a tribe or a village. Enlisted men usually serve for eighteen years, during which they participate in regular training cycles and have the opportunity to take academic courses to help them advance.
Officer Ranks
[[Image:Pakofficerexercise.jpg|thumb|250px|right|Pakistan Army officer conducting helicopter assault exercise with US Army at Fort Benning]]
About 320 men enter the army bi-annually through the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul in Abbottabad in the North West Frontier Province; a small number--especially physicians and technical specialists--are directly recruited, and these persons are part of the heart of the officer corps. The product of a highly competitive selection process, members of the officer corps have completed twelve years of education and spend two years at the Pakistan Military Academy, with their time divided about equally between military training and academic work to bring them up to a baccalaureate education level, which includes English-language skills.
The army has twelve other training establishments, including schools concentrating on specific skills such as infantry, artillery, intelligence, or mountain warfare. A National University of Science and Technology (NUST) has been established which has absorbed the existing colleges of engineering, signals, and electrical engineering. At the apex of the army training system is the Command and Staff College at Quetta, one of the few institutions inherited from the colonial period. The college offers a ten-month course in tactics, staff duties, administration, and command functions through the division level. Students from foreign countries, including the United States, have attended the school but reportedly have been critical of its narrow focus and failure to encourage speculative thinking or to give adequate attention to less glamorous subjects, such as logistics.
The senior training institution for all service branches is the National Defence University. Originally established in 1971 at Rawalpindi, to provide training in higher military strategy for senior officers, the school house was relocated to Islamabad in 1995. It also offers courses that allow civilians to explore the broader aspects of national security. In a program begun in the 1980s to upgrade the intellectual standards of the officer corps and increase awareness of the wider world, a small group of officers, has been detailed to academic training, achieving master's degrees and even doctorates at universities in Pakistan and abroad.
Pakistani officers were sent abroad during the 1950s and into the 1960s for training in Britain and other Commonwealth countries, and especially to the United States, where trainees numbering well in the hundreds attended a full range of institutions ranging from armored and infantry schools to the higher staff and command institutions. After 1961 this training was coordinated under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, but numbers varied along with vicissitudes in the United States-Pakistan military relationship. Of some 200 officers being sent abroad annually in the 1980s, over two-thirds went to the United States, but the cessation of United States aid in 1990 entailed suspension of the IMET program. In 1994 virtually all foreign training was in Commonwealth countries. However, after the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan again has begun sending officers to US Army schools. Today there are more than 400 officers serving in foreign countries.
Officers retire between the ages of fifty-two and sixty, depending on their rank.
Relief Operations and Economic Development
In times of natural disaster, such as the great floods of 1992 or the October 2005 devastating earthquake, army engineers, medical and logistics personnel, and the armed forces played a major role in bringing relief and supplies.
The army also engaged in extensive economic activities. Most of these enterprises, such as stud and dairy farms, were for the army's own use, but others performed functions beneficial to the local civilian economy. Army factories produced such goods as sugar, fertilizer, and brass castings and sold them to civilian consumers.
Several army organizations performed functions that were important to the civilian sector across the country. For example, the National Logistics Cell was responsible for trucking food and other goods across the country; the Frontier Works Organization built the Karakoram Highway to China; and the Special Communication Organization maintained communications networks in remote parts of Pakistan.
Women and Minorities in the Army
Women
Women have served in the Pakistani Army since its foundation. Currently, there is a sizable number of Women serving in the army. Most women are recruited in the regular Army to perform medical and educational work. There is also a Women's Guard section of Pakistan's National Guard where women are trained in nursing, welfare and clerical work and there are also women recruited in very limited numbers for the Janbaz Force. Only recently has Pakistan began to recruit women for combat positions and the Elite Anti-Terrorist Force recently graduated women candidates to be Sky Marshals for Pakistan based airlines.[17] In addition recently eight of the 41 cadets from the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul became the first women guards of honour.[18] Pakistan is the only country in the Islamic world to have women Major Generals in the Army.[19]
Minorities
Recruitment is nationwide and the army attempts to maintain an ethnic balance but most enlisted recruits, as in British times, come from a few districts in northern Punjab Province and the adjacent Azad Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province. Pakistan's Officer Corps are also mostly from Punjab and the North West Frontier Province and of middle-class, rural backgrounds. This has caused some resentment to the other ethnic groups in Pakistan especially when the Army conducts operation in those areas where Punjabis are not a majority. The army has been criticized by the locals for lacking ethnic sensitivity. Efforts have been undertaken to recruit more ethnic groups such as Sindhis, and Balochis into the Pakistani Army.
Minorities in Pakistan are allowed to sit in all examinations, including the one conducted by Inter Services Selection Board however the proportion of religious minorities in the Pakistan army is still considerably very less. The first Sikh officer was recently inducted into the army and is expected to set the tone for future recruitment for minorities.[20] The Pakistan army also recruited a Hindu for the first time in its 60-year-old history. [21] The army sees itself as a national institution and thus many non-Muslim officers (including Qadiyanis) have achieved high ranks within the army[22].
Rank Structure and Uniform Insignia
| Pakistani Officer Ranks | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rank | Field Marshal (5-Star) | General (4-Star) | Lieutenant General (3-Star) | Major General (2-Star) | Brigadier (1-Star) | Colonel | Lieutenant Colonel | Major | Captain | Lieutenant | 2nd Lieutenant |
| NATO equivalent | OF-10 | OF-9 | OF-8 | OF-7 | OF-6 | OF-5 | OF-4 | OF-3 | OF-2 | OF-1 | OF-1 |
| Uniform insignia | |||||||||||
| Pakistani Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) and Enlisted Ranks | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rank | Subedar Major (JCO) | Subedar (JCO) | Naib Subedar (JCO) | Battalion Havildar Major | Battalion Quartermaster Havildar | Company Havildar Major | Company Quatermaster Havildar | Havildar | Naik | Lance Naik | Jawan |
| NATO equivalent | None | None | None | OR-9 | OR-8 | OR-8 | OR-7 | OR-5/6 | OR-4 | OR-3 | OR-1/2 |
| Uniform insignia | File:Subedar.gif | No Insignia | |||||||||
Nishan-e-Haider
The Nishan-e-Haider (Urdu: نشان حیدر) (Sign of the Lion), is the highest military award given by Pakistan.
Recipients Nishan-e-Haider recipients receive an honorary title as a sign of respect: Shaheed meaning martyr for deceased recipients and Ghazi meaning victor for living recipients.
- Captain Muhammad Sarwar Shaheed (1910–July 27, 1948)
- Major Tufail Muhammad Shaheed (1914–August 7, 1958)
- Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed (1928–September 10, 1965)
- Major Muhammad Akram Shaheed (1938–1971)
- Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas Shaheed(Air Force) (1951–August 20, 1971)
- Major Shabbir Sharif Shaheed (1943–December 6, 1971)
- Jawan Sowar Muhammad Hussain Shaheed (1949–December 10, 1971)
- Lance Naik Muhammad Mahfuz Shaheed (1944–December 17, 1971)
- Captain Karnal Sher Khan Shaheed (1970–July 5, 1999)
- Lalak Jan Shaheed (1967–July 7, 1999)
Special Forces
The Special Service Group (SSG) is an independent commando division of the Pakistan Army. It is an elite special operations force similar to the British Special Air Service and the United States Army Special Forces (Green Berets). Official numbers are put between 2,500 to 3,000; however the actual strength is classified. It is estimated to have been increased to 4 Battalions, with the eventual formation of 2 Brigades of Special Forces (6 Battalions).
Weapons and Equipment
Small Arms
- Heckler & Koch MP5 9 mm carbines and the Carbine 1A 9 mm sub-machine guns*
- Machine Gun MG3*
- SMG PK, Type 1 & 2*
- Assault Rifle G3, Types A3 & P4*
- Anti Aircraft Machine Gun 12.7 mm, Type 54*
- Steyr SSG-4 and SSG-P2 (sniper rifles) *
- M82 Barrett rifle (US - Semi-Auto Rifle - .50 BMG)
- AK-47 (currently being phased out) *
- Type 81 Assault Rifle
- M4 Carbine (in service with SF)
- AK-103 Assault Rifle
- Styer Sniper Rifle
*All Pakistani small arms are indigenously produced
| Vehicle/System/Aircraft | Firm Number in Service | Status |
|---|---|---|
| T-80UD Main Battle Tank | 320 | In service. |
| Al Khalid Main Battle Tank | 600 | In Service; Currently under production |
| Type 85IIAP Main Battle Tank | 500 | In Service. Being phased out |
| Al-Zarar Tank Main Battle Tank | 320 | Currently under production |
| Type 69IIAP (Chinese T-59 Upgrade) | 250 | Being phased out by Al Khalid |
| T-63 & 60 Light Tank | 100 | Being phased out |
| Type 59 | 1200 | Being phased out by Al Zarrar & Al Khalid II |
| M48 Patton | 200 | Being phased out by Al Khalid |
| Al-Khalid II Main Battle Tank | ??? | Under production. |
| Hamza Infantry fighting Vehicle | ??? | Being procured |
| Al-Fahd Infantry fighting vehicle | 140 | In Service |
| Talha Armoured Personnel Carrier | 400+ | Final number to be around 2,000 |
| Saad Armoured Personnel Carrier | ??? | Currently in production |
| M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier | 1500+ | In Service |
| BTR-70 Armoured Personnel Carrier | 169 | In Service |
| Mohafiz Light Armoured Personnel Carrier | ??? | In Service & Additional APCs being procured |
| Scorpion Light jeep | 260 | In Service |
| Al Qaswa Logistical Vehicle | ?? | Being procured |
| M109A5 155 mm Self-Propelled Howitzer | ??? | 115 Ordered along with 150 A5 upgrade kits |
| M109A2 155 mm Self-Propelled Howitzer | 150 | In Service |
| M110A2 203 mm Self-Propelled Howitzer | 40 | In Service |
| M-7 105 mm Self-Propelled Howitzer | 50 | In Service |
| T-56 85 mm Towed Artillery | 200 | In Service |
| M-56 105 mm Towed Artillery | 80 | In Service |
| M-101 105 mm Towed Artillery | 300 | In Service |
| T-60 122 mm Towed Artillery | 200 | In Service |
| T-54 122 mm Towed Artillery | 400 | In Service |
| T-59I 130 mm Towed Artillery | 200 | In Service |
| M-59 155 mm Towed Artillery | 30 | In Service |
| M-114 155 mm Towed Artillery | 60 | In Service |
| M-198 155 mm Towed Artillery | 120 | In Service |
| M-115 203 mm Towed Artillery | 40 | In Service |
| Panter T-155 mm Towed Artillery | 12 | Ordered from Turkey |
| AH-1F/S Cobra Attack Helicopter | 70+ | In Service |
| Bell 412 Huey Transport Helicopter | 25 | In Service |
| Bell 206 Jet Ranger Transport Helicopter | 5 | In Service |
| UH-1 Huey Transport Helicopter | 10 | In Service |
| Puma Transport Helicopter | 25 | In Service |
| Mil Mi-17 Transport Helicopter | 46 | Additional helicopters planned |
| Bell 407 Light Transport Helicopter | ?? | 40 On Order |
| Eurocopter AS-550 Light Transport Helicopter | ?? | Replacing Alouette III & Lama |
| Aerospatiale Alouette III Light Transport Helicopter | ?? | Being phased out |
| Lama Light Transport Helicopter | ?? | Being phased out |
Mortars
- (Type) 81 mm
- AM-ffff Series 120 mm
- Type 63-1
Anti-tank Guided Weapons
- TOW ATGM
- TOW II (recently procured)
- Bakter-Shikan ATGM
Army Air Defence
- AA guns ZU-23/33 30, 36, 37 mm
- RBS-23 BAMSE
- RBS-70
- SA-7 Grail
- FIM-92 Stinger
Missiles
List of Pakistani Strategic Missiles:
| Designation | Other Name | Range | Payload | Status | Inventory |
| Hatf-I/IA | 80/100 km | 500 kg | Deployed | 100+ | |
| Abdali | Hatf-II | 180 km | 500 kg | Deployed, Under production | Unknown |
| Ghaznavi | Hatf-III | 1290 km | 500 kg | Deployed, Under production | 100+ |
| Shaheen-I | Hatf-IV | 2750 km | 750 kg | Deployed, Under production | 75-150 |
| Ghauri-I | Hatf-V | 1500 km | 700-1000 kg | Deployed, Under production | 100+ |
| Ghauri-II | Hatf-VA | 2,000km, More range with lighter payload. | 1200 kg | Operational, Under production | 100+ |
| Shaheen-II | Hatf-VI | 2,500km, More range with lighter payload. | 1000+ kg | Deployed, Under production | 200+ |
| Babur | Hatf-VII | 500 km | 500 kg | Deployed, Cruise Missile | 400-1000 |
| Ghauri-III | Hatf-VIII | 4,000 km | 1000+ kg | unknown | |
| M-11 | 300 km | 500 kg | In service | Unknown | |
| Shaheen-III | 3,600+ km | 1000+ kg | unknown | ||
| Tipu Sultan | 5,000+ km | 1500 kg | under development |
Note: every missile has nuclear payload.
The M-11 Chinese missile is in service too, which is a Short-Range Ballistic Missile with a max range of 300km it uses solid fuel and can carry a payload of around 500 kg.
In addition, there exists the Shaheen-III which is under research and development and will be solid fueled like the others in the Shaheen series. It will have a range of 3600+ km and a payload of 1000+ kg. This weapon is an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile.
It has been recently reported by the Pakistani Press (Daily Jang) that Pakistan has the ability to MIRV its missiles. This has been seen as possibly the greatest achievement to date. It has also been reported that Pakistan would likely MIRV its Shaheen II missile.
Future Plans
Throughout the International Defence Exhibition & Seminar (IDEAS) at Karachi in November 2006, Pakistani firms have signed joint development, production and marketing agreements with defence firms from South Korea, France and Ukraine. These agreements include new reactive armour bricks, 155 mm artillery shells, and other developments in armour and land weaponry. These agreements all relate to the Pakistan Army's AFFDP-2019 modernization program of its armour, artillery and infantry.
A few months prior to IDEAS 2006, the Pakistan Army and Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) announced the development of the Al Khalid II Main Battle Tank (MBT). The Al Khalid II is poised to become the Pakistan Army's backbone main battle tank from 2012; thus replacing 1200 obsolete Chinese T-59 and 300 T-85IIAP. Not much is known about this tank, but it is reported that the Al Khalid II is a very extensive upgrade of the current Al Khalid. Other reports suggest that it will be an entirely new tank that is based off Western designs. Turkish press reported that a Pakistani armour firm will participate in the Turkey's new generation tank project. Turkey and Pakistan have signed many memorandums of understanding in various defence-related fields. Given that many Pakistani firms have signed joint agreements with Western firms, it is possible that a considerable part of the Al Khalid II's design will be influenced from the Turkish tank design. Nonetheless, the new generation tank is expected to form the backbone of the Pakistan Army's tank force; in the long-term.
The Pakistan Army will standardize its artillery capability to 155 mm by 2019. This can be seen by the acquisition of 115 M109A5 self-propelled howitzers from the United States, and joint production deals of 155 mm shells with French and South Korean firms. It is expected that the army will procure a range of light, medium and heavy towed and self-propelled howitzer artillery from China, Europe and the United States. These will replace all non-155 mm and older systems. The Army reportedly ordered and procured an undisclosed number of WS-1B Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). As part of the artillery modernization program, the Army will likely procure a fair number of new MLRS systems of various ranges and shell sizes.
Modernization of the Army Aviation is underway with the procurement of new transport and attack helicopters from the United States, Russia and Europe. Finalized acquisitions include 26 Bell 412EP and at least a dozen Mi-17 medium-lift transport helicopters from the U.S and Russia, respectively. Forty Bell 407 and an unknown number of Fennec light helicopters from the U.S. and Eurocopter have also been ordered, respectively. Plans are underway to begin replacing the IAR 330 Puma, older Mil Mi-8/17, Bell Jet Rangers and older Huey helicopters; options include the Eurocopter NH-90 Tactical Transport Helicopter and UH-60M Blackhawk. The Pakistan Army has procured dozens of excess AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters since 2002; at least 20 have been brought into service to supplement the serving 18. The army reportedly has upgraded its entire fleet with AH-1Z King Cobra avionics and new weapon systems such as the TOW-2 and Hellfire missiles. Up to 30 new-generation attack helicopters will be procured to further enhance the Army's attack aviation arm; options include the Eurocopter Tiger, South African AH-2 Rooivalk and Boeing AH-64D Apache Longbow.
See also
- 20FF - 20th Frontier Force
- List of countries with nuclear weapons
- Nuclear power
- Nuclear power in Pakistan
- Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction
- Military of Pakistan
Notes
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m "" List of Chief of army staff"". Archived from the original.. http://www.regiments.org/biography/defchiefs/pkCinC.htm. Retrieved on 2007-01-21.
- ^ "" Subdivisions of the army"". Archived from the original.. http://www.fotw.net/flags/pk%5Eard.html. Retrieved on 2007-01-21.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k "Three Corps Commander Replaced". Archived from the original.. http://www.dawn.com/2006/04/11/top8.htm. Retrieved on 2007-04-17.
- ^ a b c d "Five Army officials promoted". Archived from the original.. http://www.dawn.com/2005/09/24/top13.htm. Retrieved on 2007-04-17.
- ^ a b c d e "6 New Lt Gens". Archived from the original.. http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=10242. Retrieved on 2007-09-23.
- ^ a b c d e f g h "New Postings and Promotions". Archived from the original.. http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/15/top9.htm. Retrieved on 2007-04-17.
- ^ a b c d e f g Khan, Iftikhar. "Strategic forces command gets new head". Archived from the original.. http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/08/top8.htm. Retrieved on 2007-04-17.
- ^ Sheikh, Shakil. "New QMG". Archived from the original.. http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/may2005-daily/06-05-2005/main/main5.htm. Retrieved on 2007-04-17.
- ^ "New 10 Corps commander". Archived from the original.. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C10%5C05%5Cstory_5-10-2006_pg1_3. Retrieved on 2007-04-17.
- ^ "Pakistan achieves excellence in defence production". Archived from the original.. http://www.dawn.com/2006/04/11/welcome.htm. Retrieved on 2007-04-17.
- ^ "New Surgeon General". Archived from the original.. http://www.ispr.gov.pk/Archive&Press/Jan2005/13-Jan.htm. Retrieved on 2007-09-21.
- ^ "NAB Punjab DG Transferred". Archived from the original.. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\09\30\story_30-9-2007_pg7_4. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
- ^ a b "Major Army Reshuffle". Archived from the original.. http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=10213. Retrieved on 2007-09-21.
- ^ "CJ case caused huge damage: Ramday". Archived from the original.. http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=8712. Retrieved on 2007-09-21.
- ^ http://www.fauji.org.pk/
- ^ http://www.fauji.org.pk/Webforms/FFWelfare.aspx?Id=81
- ^ "" Pakistan Female Sky Marshalls"". Archived from the original.. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2144140.stm. Retrieved on 2007-01-21.
- ^ "" Pakistan Female honour guards"". Archived from the original.. http://www.ibnlive.com/news/pak-army-soon-have-women-officers/29471-2.html. Retrieved on 2007-01-21.
- ^ "" Pakistan is the only country in the Islamic world to have women Major Generals "". Archived from the original.. http://zahranaqvi.wordpress.com/2007/03/08/international-women%E2%80%99s-day-and-pakistan/. Retrieved on 2007-04-16.
- ^ ""Sikh cadet in Pakistan army"". Archived from the original.. http://us.rediff.com/news/2005/dec/20sikh.htm?q=tp&file=.htm. Retrieved on 2007-01-21.
- ^ ""Pakistan army recruits Hindu cadet"". Archived from the original.. http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/sep/24pak.htm. Retrieved on 2007-01-21.
- ^ ""Ahmadis in Pakistan army"". Archived from the original.. http://www.dawn.com/2006/04/22/nat8.htm. Retrieved on 2007-01-21.
References
- Cloughley, Brian. A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections, 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. ISBN 978-0195473346.
Further reading
- Ayub, Muhammad. An Army, Its Role and Rule: A History of the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil, 1947–1999. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Rosedog Books. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3.
External links
- Pakistan Army
- Inter Services Public Relations - Pak Army
- Global Security
- Pakistan Army details
- Pashtuns in Pakistan Army
- First Sikh of Pakistan Army
- Pakistan Army (PakA)
- "Pakistan army is deep into business", Marketplace, November 6, 2007
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 Pakistan Army |  Pakistan Navy |  Pakistan Air Force
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