Tet Offensive

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For criticism see Criticism of Tet_Offensive

Tet Offensive
Part of the Vietnam War
File:TetMap.jpg Some Viet Cong targets during the Tet Offensive
Date Phrase 1: 30/1 - 25/2, Phrase 2: 5/5 - 15/6, Phrase 3: 17/8 - 30/9 năm 1968 Location South Vietnam Result US and South Vietnamese tactical victory.[1] North Vietnam/NLF propaganda and political victory Depletion of Vietcong leading to replacement by North Vietnamese
Belligerents
South Vietnam  United States  South Korea  Australia  New Zealand	Viet Cong North Vietnam
Commanders
William C. Westmoreland	Võ Nguyên Giáp
Strength
~1,000,000[2]	~323,000 - 595,000[3]
Casualties and losses
In phrase 1: South Vietnam: 4,954 killed 15,917 wounded 926 missing Allied forces: 4,124 killed 19,295 wounded 604 missing Total Allied military: Approximately 45,820 casualties (9,078 killed, 35,212 wounded, 1,530 missing)[4] [5] Total 3 phrases: 90.000 killed and wounded [6]	In phrase 1:: Est. 17,000 killed and 20,000 wounded To August: 75,000+[7] Total 3 phrases: 44.842 killed, 61.267 wounded, 5.070 missing[8]
Civilian: 14,000 killed, 24,000 wounded

The Tet Offensive was a military campaign during the Vietnam War that began on January 31, 1968. Forces of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam, or Viet Cong, and the People's Army of Vietnam, or North Vietnamese army, fought against the forces of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), the United States, and their allies. The purpose of the offensive was to strike military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam and to spark a general uprising among the population that would then topple the Saigon government, thus ending the war in a single blow.^[9]

The operations are referred to as the Tet Offensive because they began during the early morning hours of 31 January 1968, Tết Nguyên Đán, the first day of the year on a traditional lunar calendar and the most important Vietnamese holiday. Both North and South Vietnam announced on national radio broadcasts that there would be a two-day cease-fire during the holiday. In Vietnamese, the offensive is called Cuộc Tổng tiến công và nổi dậy ("General Offensive and Uprising"), or Tết Mậu Thân (Tet, year of the monkey).

The Viet Cong launched a wave of attacks on the morning of 31 January in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This early attack did not, however, cause undue alarm or lead to widespread allied defensive measures. When the main Viet Cong operation began the next morning, the offensive was countrywide in scope and well coordinated, with more than 80,000 communist troops striking more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of the six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns, and the national capital.^[10] The offensive was the largest military operation yet conducted by either side up to that point in the war.

The initial attacks stunned allied forces and took them by surprise, but most were quickly contained and beaten back, inflicting massive casualties on communist forces. At Huế intense fighting lasted for a month and the Vietcong executed thousands of residents in the Massacre of Huế. Around the U.S. combat base at Khe Sanh fighting continued for two more months. Although the offensive was a military defeat for the communists, it had a profound effect on the American administration and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the communists were, due to previous defeats, incapable of launching such a massive effort.

The term "Tet offensive" usually refers to the January-February 1968 Viet Cong offensive, but it can also include the so-called "mini-Tet" offensives that took place in May and August.

Background

"Light at the end of the tunnel"

– Although General Westmoreland never uttered this phrase (it was coined by General Henri Navarre during the First Indochina War), it came into general parlance during the Vietnam War and has become a catchphrase for similar situations

Order of battle and communist capabilities

During the fall of 1967, two questions weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson: Was the U.S. strategy of attrition working in South Vietnam and who was winning the war? According to General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the answer could be found by the solution to a simple equation. Take the total number of communist troops estimated in-country and subtract those killed or captured during military operations to determine the "crossover point" at which the number of those eliminated exceeded those recruited or replaced. There was a discrepancy, however, between MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) order of battle estimates concerning the strength of communist guerrilla forces within South Vietnam.^[11] In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be utilized by the administration as a gauge of U.S. success in the conflict.

Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City, the CIA members of the group believed that the number of communist guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000.^[12] Westmoreland was deeply concerned about the possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate, since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings.^[13] According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph McChristian, the new figures "would create a political bombshell," since they were positive proof that the communists "had the capability and the will to continue a protracted war of attrition."^[12]

In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that Viet Cong militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low level fifth columnists used for information collection.^[14] The agency responded that such a notion was ridiculous, since the militias were directly responsible for half of the casualties inflicted on U.S. forces. With both groups in deadlock, George Carver, CIA deputy director for Vietnamese affairs, was asked to mediate the dispute. In September, Carver devised a compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position.^[15] George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms, the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem...[Helms] didn't want the agency...contravening the policy interest of the administration."^[16]

Success Offensive

During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies.^[17] According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967.^[18] This trend was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight.^[19] A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win - or get out."^[20] This prompted the administration to launch a so-called "Success Offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow, the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification was fed to the press and to the Congress. "We are beginning to win this struggle" asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC's "Today Show" in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. Territory is being gained. We are making steady progress."^[21] At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, to Washington, D.C., for what was billed as a "high level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the pacification program in the countryside was succeeding. Sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of the Vietcong.^[22] General Bruce Palmer, Jr., one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to trying to survive in the mountains."^[23]

Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November he reported that, as of the end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive...I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view."^[21] By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of the American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war.^[24] The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing...adopted a 'wait and see' attitude."^[25] During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland defied the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something, because we are looking for a fight."^[26]

Northern decisions

Party politics

Planning in Hanoi for a winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. There has been an extreme reluctance among communist historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the General Offensive General Uprising, even decades after the event.^[27] In official North Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch Tet Mau Than was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against the North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S.^[28] The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated.

The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the Party leadership between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that the economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and who generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theoritician Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp. The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of the People's Republic of China and stridently called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and Lê Ðức Thọ (no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam.^[29]

General Nguyễn Chí Thanh the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), communist headquarters for the South, was another prominent militant. Strangely, the followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong.^[30]

By 1966-1967, however, after the infliction of massive casualties by the allies, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. air power, there was a dawning realization that, if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South.^[31] As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that the policy of rejecting negotiations was in error.^[32] The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking." During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy.^[33]

During the same period, a counterattack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh, Lê Ðức Thọ, and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy Trinh, who called for negotiations.^[34] From October 1966 through April 1967, a very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp.^[35] Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam.^[36] Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating the past."^[37]

The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element as well, because North Vietnam was totally dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of its military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that a conventional conflict might draw them in as it had in Korea. They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy, therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas."^[38]

To "break the will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies" hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair.^[39] All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed General Offensive.^[40] This move cemented the position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: The rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December.

General Offensive and Uprising

The operational plan for the General Offensive and Uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi the following month. The general was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo.^[41] On the evening of 6 July, after being given permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after having drunk too much.^[42]

After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of the population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the communists to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat effective; the results of the fall 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election (in which the Nguyễn Văn Thiệu/Nguyễn Cao Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of 1963 and 1966; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of the Thieu government in the southern press.^[43] Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what have been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced."^[39]

In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at the 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968.^[44] The resultant Resolution 14 was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction." Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible."^[45]

Contrary to Western belief, General Giáp did not plan or command the offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy, Phạm Hùng, and then modified by Giáp.^[46] The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under duress," he may have found the task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait accompli.^[47] Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the Viet Cong. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for the Party militants. For the moderates and centrists it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory."^[48]

The operation would involve a preliminary phase during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The General Offensive, General Uprising would then proceed by launching simultaneous actions in most of the urban areas of South Vietnam and attacks on major allied bases, with particular emphasis focused on the cities of Saigon and Hue. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against the U.S. combat base at Khe Sanh. The Khe Sanh actions would draw North Vietnamese forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary in order to protect his supply lines and divert American attention.^[49] Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt.^[50] The offensive, therefore was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S.^[51]

According to General Trần Văn Trà, the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 31 January, was to be a country-wide assault on the cities conducted primarily by Vietcong forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, followup operations would be conducted to wear down the enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May; and Phase III on 17 August.^[52]

Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.^[53] This logistical effort also involved re-arming the Viet Cong with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over their less well-armed ARVN opponents. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi would rather than could open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended Operation Rolling Thunder, the bombing campaign against North Vietnam.^[54] This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year.

South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that communist forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 North Vietnamese regulars, 160,000 Viet Cong and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six sapper battalions.^[55]

Continued at Tet Offensive part 2

See also

• Nguyễn Văn Lém
• Tet 1969

References

Notes

Sources

Published government documents

• Hammond, William H. (1988). The United States Army in Vietnam, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History. 
• Hoang Ngoc Lung (1978). The General Offensives of 1968–69. McLean VA: General Research Corporation. 
• Schulimson, Jack; Blaisol, Leonard; Smith, Charles R.; Dawson, David (1997). The U.S. Marines in Vietnam: 1968, the Decisive Year. Washington DC: History and Museums Division, United States Marine Corps. ISBN 0-16-049125-8. 
• Shore, Moyars S., III (1969). The Battle of Khe Sanh. Washington DC: U.S. Marine Corps Historical Branch. 
• Tran Van Tra (1983). Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theater, Volume 5: Concluding the 30 Years War. Southeast Asia Report No. 1247. Washington DC: Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
• Military History Institute of Vietnam (2002). Victory in Vietnam: A History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, trans. Pribbenow, Merle, Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press. ISBN 0700611754. 

Primary sources

• Sheehan, Neil; Smith, Hedrick; Kenworthy, E. W.; Butterfield, Fox (1971). The Pentagon Papers. New York: Bantam. 

Memoirs and biographies

• Bui Diem (1999). In the Jaws of History. Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press. ISBN 0253213010. 
• Bui Tin (2002). From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 155750881X. 
• Clifford, Clark (1991). Counsel to the President: A Memoir. New York: Random House. ISBN 0394569954. 
• Johnson, Lyndon B (1971). The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. ISBN 0030844924. 
• Westmoreland, William C. (1976). A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday. ISBN 0385004346. 
• Zaffiri, Samuel (1994). Westmoreland. New York: William Morrow. ISBN 0688111793. 

Secondary sources

• Ang Cheng Guan (July 1998). "Decision-making Leading to the Tet Offensive (1968) – The Vietnamese Communist Perspective". Journal of Contemporary History 33. 
• Arnold, James R. (1990). The Tet Offensive 1968. Westport CT: Praeger. ISBN 0-275-98452-4. 
• Braestrup, Peter (1983). Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet in Vietnam and Washington. New Haven CT: Yale University Press. ISBN 0300029535. 
• Davidson, Phillip (1988). Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975. Novato CA: Presidio Press. ISBN 0891413065. 
• Doyle, Edward (1986). The North. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. ISBN 0939526212. 
• Dougan, Clark (1983). Nineteen Sixty-Eight. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. ISBN 0939526069. 
• Duiker, William J. (1996). The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. Boulder CO: Westview Press. ISBN 0813385873. 
• Elliot, David (2003). The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930–1975. 2 vols. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 076560602X. 
• Gilbert, Marc J. (1996). The Tet Offensive. Westport CT: Praeger. ISBN 0275954803. 
• Hayward, Stephen (April 2004). The Tet Offensive: Dialogues. 
• Karnow, Stanley (1991). Vietnam: A History. New York: Penguin. ISBN ISBN 0-670-84218-4hc. 
• Maitland, Terrence (1983). A Contagion of War. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. ISBN 0939526050. 
• Lewy, Gunther (1980). America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195027329. 
• Morocco, John (1984). Thunder from Above: Air War, 1941–1968. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. ISBN 0939526093. 
• Nguyen, Lien-Hang T. (2006). "The War Politburo: North Vietnam's Diplomatic and Political Road to the Tet Offensive". Journal of Vietnamese Studies 1. 
• Oberdorfer, Don (1971). Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0-8018-6703-7. 
• Palmer, Dave Richard (1978). Summons of the Trumpet: The History of the Vietnam War from a Military Man's Viewpoint. New York: Ballentine. 
• Pisor, Robert (1982). The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh. New York: Ballentine Books. ISBN 0393322696. 
• Prados, John (1991). Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0395550033. 
• Schandler, Herbert Y. (1977). The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691022224. 
• Schmitz, David F. (2004). The Tet Offensive: Politics, War, and Public Opinion. Westport CT: Praeger. ISBN 0742544869. 
• Smedberg, Marco (2008). Vietnamkrigen: 1880–1980. Historiska Media. ISBN 9185507881. 
• Sorley, Lewis (1999). A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. New York: Harvest Books. ISBN 0156013096. 
• Stanton, Shelby L. (1985). The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1973. New York: Dell. ISBN 0891412328. 
• Spector, Ronald H. (1993). After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. New York: The Free Press. ISBN 0679750460. 
• Tran Van Tra (1994). "Tet: The 1968 General Offensive and General Uprising", in Warner, Jayne S.; Luu Doan Huynh: The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 1563241315. 
• Wiest, Andrew (2002). The Vietnam War, 1956–1975. London: Osprey Publishers. ISBN 1841764191. 
• Willbanks, James H. (2008). The Tet Offensive: A Concise History. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 023112841X. 
• Wirtz, James J. (1991). The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0801482097. 

External links

• A Viet Nam Reappraisal Clark M. Clifford
• How Great Nations Can Win Small Wars YAGIL HENKINA Azure spring 5766 / 2006, No. 24
• Westmoreland request for troops Feb 12(#68)
• Tet Offensive Research Project
• Bibliography: The Tet Offensive and the Battle of Khe Sanh
• [1]
• Cantigny First Division Oral History Project